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1. Migration in Southern Europe: A European Challenge
Since the closure of legal immigration channels in Central and Northern Europe 
in the mid-1970s, immigrants began to arrive in Southern European countries, 
consid ering these countries partly as stepping stones towards their richer neigh-
bours and partly as immigration destinations in their own right. Th e economic 
growth experi enced by Southern Europe in the 1980s, the entry of Greece (1981) 
and then Portugal and Spain (1986) in the European Communities, the increas-
ing education level of young populations and their consequent ﬂ eeing from low 
skilled jobs, and the rela tive booming of the informal economy in these countries 
have created employment opportunities for immigrants. As a matter of fact, 
Southern European countries, Spain and Italy in particular, ﬁ gure in recent years 
at the top of the list as immigrant destinations among EU member states.
Post-1989 migration however presents some features that diﬀ erentiate it from 
the post-war migration in the 1960s and 1970s: 
–  Its origins are more varied, as immigrants come from diﬀ erent continents, 
includ ing a high presence of Latin Americans, absent in previous migratory 
movements towards Europe. East Europeans form also a new and important 
component of the immigration inﬂ ows in the post-1989 period.
–  While post-war immigration ﬂ ows in Europe were largely absorbed in indus-
trial jobs, post-1989 immigrants arrived in a post-industrial Europe, where 
globaliza tion, outplacement and outsourcing have reduced greatly the weight 
of industrial jobs in the work market. Immigrants are predominantly 
employed in construction, agriculture, retail trade, catering, caring, cleaning 
and other types of services. Th eir employers are small and medium enter-
prises and private households and their jobs are highly aﬀ ected by seasonal 
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changes. Moreover, small size compa nies and households face bigger 
diﬃ  culties to anticipate or plan their labour needs.
–  Contrary to the European immigration experience of the 1960s, immigra-
tion ar rived to Southern Europe since the 1980s was neither mediated nor 
planned by re ceiving States. Th e legal and political reaction of Southern 
European countries in front of the phenomenon has been shaped by both 
external (EU pressure to deal eﬀ ectively with irregular migration particularly 
since these countries entered the Schengen no-internal-border zone) and 
internal factors (caught unprepared to deal with massive immigration, 
southern European countries dealt with immigration though piecemeal 
measures initially). 
Th e uncoupling of North and South European migration phases has caused polit-
ical conﬂ icts, as the second were receiving (and absorbing) large inﬂ ows of eco-
nomic immigrants while most of the ﬁ rst tried to avoid economic immigration. 
In addition, during this last decade, security aspects in the emerging common 
European immi gration policy were reinforced as a response to international ter-
rorism. Th is pre-eminence of security over demographic or economic issues has 
widened the distance between North and South on this realm, as the second was 
frequently perceived as too permissive and hence counteracting the tightening of 
immigration policy in the North. In this context of increased fear towards irregu-
lar migration and increasingly restrictive (even if diﬃ  cult to implement) migra-
tion control policies, this special is sue seeks to provide for a better understanding 
of the migration challenges that the southern European countries have been fac-
ing and the ways they have tried to deal with them. 
Th e main aim of this special issue is to analyse the development and implementa-
tion of migration management and control policies in the four southern Euro-
pean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). In particular, we shall address 
the socio-political context within which these migration policies were formulated 
and seek to understand better the link between control and management policies. 
We shall investigate the social and political forces that have inﬂ uenced in each 
country the making of migration policies, with special reference to public opin-
ion, media, political parties, trade unions and employers’ associations. 
2. Comparing the New Hosts of Southern Europe
Until a couple of decades ago, Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal and Spain) have been migration senders rather than hosts. Emigration, 
however, nearly came to a halt in the mid to late 1970s after the tightening up of 
migration re gimes in Northern Europe. A positive net migration rate was regis-
tered in Greece and Italy during the 1970s and in Spain and Portugal in the early 
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1980s. Initially this im migration was to an extent return migration of former 
citizens and their descendants that had previously emigrated to South America, 
North America, Australia, other European countries or also in the case of Portu-
gal to former Portuguese colonies in sub Saharan Africa. In all four countries 
immigration ﬂ ows were related both to their own economic and political devel-
opment and democratic consolidation but also to the geopolitical changes of 
1989 in Central and Eastern Europe and the opening up of the borders of the 
former Communist countries. 
Th ere are a number of features that the four countries share apart from their 
rather sudden conversion from emigration to immigration societies.
First, these countries form the southern frontier of the European Union, three 
of which border the Mediterranean and geographic regions with a high potential 
for emigration. Th e economic diﬀ erences between the northern and southern 
shores of the Mediterranean are large: the per capita income in Spain, for instance, 
is thirteen times that of Morocco. Compared with that, the diﬀ erence between 
the USA and Mexico per capita income is much smaller (six times). Probably only 
the diﬀ erence between the two Koreas is larger. Immigrants are attracted however 
not only by higher incomes, but also by other social goods, such as peace, free-
dom and human security. Greece particularly but also Spain and Italy, have an 
extensive and not easy to control coastline with several small islands that provide 
for ‘stepping stones’ in the journey of irregular migrants into the southern Euro-
pean countries and potentially into other EU countries. Furthermore, tourism is 
one of the most important economic sectors in Southern Europe, and eﬀ orts 
devoted to improve the borders control to avoid irregular migration can hinder 
the tourist movement. At the same time, over staying tourist visas is the most 
important source of irregular immigration. 
Second, all four countries are characterised by segmented labour markets. With 
the exception of northern Italy and some Spanish regions, Southern European 
countries suﬀ er by rather weak and structurally imbalanced economies. Domestic 
unemploy ment exists side by side with the employment (formal or irregular) of 
hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in the low pay and low status sectors 
of the labour market. Industry is rather weak (again with the exception of north-
ern Italy and some Spanish regions) and migrants are absorbed in sectors like 
agriculture, construction, tourism, trade, catering and private care services, nota-
bly all labour-intensive sectors where informal employment is rife. 
In striking diﬀ erence with Central and Northern European countries that try 
to attract highly qualiﬁ ed immigration and avoid or diminish the non-qualiﬁ ed 
one, Southern European countries have implicitly bet on low skilled immigrants 
to main tain low productivity economic sectors. Th ousands of business which 
previously were based on intensive family work or on the hiring of low skilled 
local workers, be in the retail trade, agriculture or catering, would have disap-
peared since the im provement of level of education and labour options for local 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
EMIL 11,2_f1_109-118.indd   111 4/14/2009   8:26:12 PM
C. González-Enríquez, A. Triandafyllidou / 
112 European Journal of Migration and Law 11 (2009) 109–118
younger generations had led them out of these sectors, where employers have 
found in immigration the only source of available workforce. 
Southern economies have thus maintained labour markets where three D jobs 
continue to amount to a great portion of job oﬀ ers, while Northern European 
coun tries have reduced them to a much smaller size. A good example of this dif-
ference is the domestic sector (caring and cleaning jobs within private house-
holds). In Southern Europe in the past the sector was fed with unqualiﬁ ed women, 
mostly rural, whose only job opportunity was this one. Many of them worked as 
live-in domestic servants under labour conditions that could be seen as a form of 
modern slavery. Th e oﬀ er of young girls or women from rural areas for this type 
of domestic jobs had almost disappeared since the 1980s, as a consequence of the 
increasing level of education of younger generations, especially women, and the 
overall economic growth experienced in Southern Europe in the last decades. 
However, the arrival of immigrant women willing to accept any kind of work, 
again put this service, at the disposal of the broader middle class, while the price 
paid for it declined markedly. Migrant women came to occupy both live-in and 
live-out types of jobs in the cleaning and caring sector in private households. Th is 
in turn allowed middle class women to take up jobs outside the home while 
immigrant maids were left in charge of young children, elderly parents and gen-
eral household chores. In several northern European countries, it was welfare 
state services, such as public kinder gartens for all, welfare homes for the elderly, 
longer maternity leaves and other types of infrastructure that created the condi-
tions necessary for women’s participation in the labour market. In Southern 
European countries, where such welfare provisions were largely insuﬃ  cient, 
migrant women helped ease the tensions on double-career families and allowed 
women to work outside the home. 
Th ird, all four countries lacked a legal framework and previous administrative 
experience for managing migration. Although they all developed migration laws 
and regularly reformed them, these laws had important shortcomings and were 
usually unrealistic. Th us all four countries applied repeated regularisation pro-
grammes to address the existence of large numbers of undocumented migrants 
who lived and worked in their territories while none of them adopted a proactive 
migration man agement policy opening up viable channels for legal migration 
that would respond both to the need for migrant labour and to the pressures of 
incoming ﬂ ows. In fact, regularisations became all over the area the most impor-
tant management policy while annual labour quotas (issued per sector of the 
labour market and sometimes for spe ciﬁ c nationalities) have not been shown to 
aﬀ ect in any signiﬁ cant way this situation. In one case for instance (in Italy in 
2006) the programmed annual quota of 170,000 new workers was extended to 
550,000 to cover for the 500,000 applications sub mitted by workers who were 
actually not entering but already residing and working in the country, transform-
ing thus the quota system to an ad hoc regulari sation.
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Fourth, in the wider Southern European region, national political culture is 
marked by mistrust towards the state and clientelistic, party-political networks 
play an im portant part in political life, especially at the local level. In short, in 
Southern Europe there are important pre-modern features that shape the work-
ings of their modern bu reaucracies. Th ese features acquire particular importance 
in the ﬁ eld of migration and migration policy implementation as migrants are 
particularly vulnerable subjects in their dealings with public administration. 
Th us, migration laws have often proven to be simply not working. Bureaucratic 
hurdles, delays, inaccuracies, lack of information and guidance and requirements 
that were impossible to fulﬁ l have troubled the development of migration and 
migration policy in all four countries.
On the other hand, local societies are overall rather tolerant to irregular migra-
tion status and informal work conditions. Th us, irregular migrants are not stig-
matised by local societies because of their being undocumented. Th e combination 
of unrealistic laws, with ineﬀ ective bureaucracies and societies tolerant to illegal-
ity has produced an interesting mix of persistent illegality or semi-legality, indi-
vidual/family-based integration in local contexts and perpetuation of informal 
working conditions.
Fifth, the scarcity of public resources devoted to manage immigration is another 
common feature in Southern Europe and explains much of the resulting irregu-
larity. None of these States has developed a proactive policy to attract the immi-
grants they could need, nor did they deﬁ ne which kind of immigration they need. 
Th e measures taken on this realm (as annual quotas) have been always so obvi-
ously unrealistic; their numbers so small in comparison with the real inﬂ ows of 
migrants, that one can clearly infer that governments have opted for accepting 
irregular immigration while paying lip service to the ﬁ ght against irregularity. Th e 
lack of ﬁ nancial investment in personnel and organizational resources that could 
provide accurate and up to date in formation on labour market needs, help issue 
and renew permits swiftly, cooperate with countries of origin and overall the 
enforcement policies and practices put in place (border and internal controls, 
police detention centres, repatriations), have generated a highly chaotic process 
for dealing with immigration, which in turn has provoked domestic and interna-
tional dissatisfaction. 
Sixth, main political parties have shown in all four countries extensive overlaps 
and continuities in their policies, balancing between restrictive and integration 
poli cies, in spite of their rhetoric diﬀ erences. Both left and right governing parties 
have promoted regularisations and both have, at some moment, retreated to 
restrictive policies. Th e diﬀ erences between governmental policies in the same 
country usually has more to do with changing circumstances and with the learn-
ing factor, than with ideological or preference diﬀ erences. In Portugal and Greece, 
immigration does not even constitute an important issue or cleavage in political 
life. In Italy and Spain, where immigration has occupied in diﬀ erent moments a 
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key role in electoral competition, opposition parties tend to underline their dis-
agreement with governmen tal migration policies, stressing ideological diﬀ erences, 
while their practices when governing are not so diﬀ erent.
Seventh, trade unions have adopted in the four countries a cooperative and 
positive position towards immigration, supporting regularisations and denounc-
ing the use of irregular migrants to undermine salaries and work conditions. Th is 
broadly positive attitude towards immigrants can be explained by ideological as 
well as inter est elements. Th e solidarity approach to immigration has prevailed 
among Southern European Trade Unions, mainly as a result of previous (and 
actually quite recent) experiences of emigration (in Portugal we may even refer to 
current experiences of emigration as this last has been increasing during the last 
few years). Trade Unions have also interests in guaranteeing immigrants the same 
rights as those for local workers, to avoid the formation of an oﬀ er of underprivi-
leged workers that could damage salaries and create illegitimate competition 
in speciﬁ c job sectors. Finally, as it happens all over Europe, trade unions are 
stronger in those sectors where immigrants are almost non-existent, as big indus-
trial enterprises and the whole public sector, and this small presence or even 
absence from the sectors where im migrants concentrate makes trade unions less 
sensitive to the kind of frictions and competition – between local and immigrant 
workers – that appear in the lowest levels of job qualiﬁ cation.
Having noticed these similarities among the countries included in this special 
issue, it is worth noting an important diﬀ erence related to the inﬂ ux of religion 
on public opinion towards immigrants. Although in Southern Europe the ser-
vices provided by immigrants have created a broad base of social support to immi-
gration among middle classes, be it as employers, as ﬂ at owners rented by migrants 
or as users of services privately oﬀ ered by business contracting immigrants, immi-
gration has also given rise to negative views and feelings among low-skilled workers 
whose salaries and labour conditions have been aﬀ ected by immigrant competi-
tion. More over, the lower socio-economic strata who reside in the same neigh-
bourhoods as immigrants are negatively aﬀ ected by immigration since the public 
services oﬀ ered in these neighbourhoods have not received suﬃ  cient additional 
funding to compen sate for the increase of the population they must attend to. 
Th ese diﬀ erent social impacts of immigration form a base for diverging attitudes 
towards it, but not all ambiguities found in public opinion on this topic can be 
attributed to these objective impacts. Ideological and religious factors as national-
ism or, on the other side, Catholicism, also play a key role. Catholicism has greatly 
inﬂ uenced soft poli cies towards irregular immigrants in Italia, Spain and Portu-
gal. In Italy, for example, Catholic deputies belonging to both the government 
and opposition parties stopped the government’s proposal to increase the maxi-
mum period of detention for irregular stayers. In Spain, the Catholic Church and 
Catholic NGOs were particularly active in their defense of equal social rights for 
irregular or regular immigrants. In Portugal too, the Catholic Church has been a 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
EMIL 11,2_f1_109-118.indd   114 4/14/2009   8:26:13 PM
C. González-Enríquez, A. Triandafyllidou / 
 European Journal of Migration and Law 11 (2009) 109–118 115
prominent advocate of regularisations and the High Commissioners for Immi-
gration and Ethnic Minorities have been al ways active Catholics, including a 
priest. Th e main Catholic NGO, Caritas, has been very inﬂ uential in Spain and 
Italy, and Catholicism has inspired most of the solidarity-based approach towards 
immigrants, an inﬂ uence that goes through party frontiers. Th e Orthodox Church, 
by contrast, has not played an important part in shaping the immigration policy 
in Greece, where it is the major and state reli gion. Th e Church has remained 
overall inactive on the topic. Th is inertia or implicit negative attitude towards 
immigration can be attributed to the very close ties between Orthodoxy and the 
Greek national identity, on the one hand, and by the lack of a strong missionary 
character of the Church in the Orthodox religious tradition, on the other. 
3. Th e Contents of this Issue
Th e articles that follow in this issue present four country cases (Greece, Italy, 
Por tugal and Spain) outlining the main migration management and control chal-
lenges and policies in each country, the role of European Union, political parties, 
trade un ions, churches and public opinion in shaping the policies and providing 
the context for their implementation. Last but not least, in each article we seek to 
assess the suc cess or failure of the migration management policies and the ways in 
which they contribute to create order and disorder, legality and illegality in the 
current European context.
Claudia Finotelli and Giuseppe Sciortino in their article entitled Th e impor-
tance of being Southern: Th e making of immigration policies in Italy, focus on how 
being a ‘new’ immigration country in Southern Europe has inﬂ uenced the mak-
ing of Italian immigration policies in the last twenty years, stressing the ambigu-
ous nature of Italian immigration policies. Italian governments had adopted a 
stop-and-contain attitude towards immigration, a price Italy had to pay for its 
European membership. Th e main eﬀ orts of the Italian government were thus 
concentrated on improving external controls. However, Italy did not deny the 
necessity of labour inﬂ ows and tried since the beginning to implement a quota 
system for the entry of labour migrants. Unfortunately, quotas always underesti-
mated the necessity of the Italian economy and most of the procedures did not ﬁ t 
with the Italian policy-making and implementation infrastructure. In the Italian 
case, the diﬃ  culties in programming the new entries, weak internal controls as 
well as the attractiveness of the informal economy and the ‘expansionist’ out-
comes of a common visa policy favoured the increase of irregular migration. 
In this context, regularizations of irregular migrants appeared as a very useful 
measure to re-establish the balance between market and state and to substitute a 
weak internal control system. Regularizations enjoyed a high acceptance because 
they were based on economic legitimisation, which was in line with the general 
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attitude of Italian citizens. Italians accept immigration as long as it provides 
economic beneﬁ ts, while irregular migrants are perceived as criminals. Such 
twofold perception of immigration is reﬂ ected by the discourse of the main polit-
ical parties, which defended the economic integration of immigrants on the 
one hand while turning the struggle against irregular migration and criminality 
into a major point of their political program on the other. In this respect, the 
security issue has become an important point of connection between right- and 
left-wing parties while the inﬂ uence of trade unions on the course of Italian 
immigration policy has proved to be much more relevant than the harsh tones 
of xenophobic parties. 
In her article Spain, the cheap model. Irregularity and regularisation as immi-
gration management policy, Carmen González-Enríquez notes that Spain has 
re ceived more than ﬁ ve million immigrants in the last eight years without devel-
oping a realistic migration management policy and accepting irregularity as a 
common feature of immigrants. Th e percentage of irregular immigration was 
above 40% during most of the decade and even amounted to 50% in 2003. 
According to Euro stat, since 2000 Spain has been the European country that 
received most immi grants yearly, a third of all those reaching the EU, although 
comparisons are diﬃ  cult as Spain allows and promotes the registration of irregu-
lar immigrants. Th e Spanish attraction to immigrants was due not only to its 
economic growth and the existence of a strong and rather vibrant informal econ-
omy, but also to the Spaniards’ relatively positive social attitudes towards immi-
grants, the traditional tolerance towards ille gality embedded in South European 
political culture, and the granting of social rights for irregular immigrants. 
During these years the design of immigration policy has been governed by ambi-
guity, ambivalence, shifting priorities between control and integration and trust 
in the spontaneous adjustment between labour market demands and the arrival 
of immigrants, in a context of rapid economic growth mainly based in the con-
struction sector and employment of immigrants in low qualiﬁ ed jobs either in the 
formal or informal economy: While declaring their desire to promote ordered 
immigration and to ﬁ ght irregular arrivals, successive governments have in fact 
allowed irregular immigrants to arrive, specially from Latin America, ﬁ nd work 
and later regularise. Th e free access to medical care and to education for irregular 
immi grants has worked as a kind of compensation and as the main instrument of 
social integration. In short, a liberal, market approach dominated and gave prior-
ity to the demands of the job market over the ordering of the migratory ﬂ ows. 
Th e adjustment could have been done in a more orderly fashion, which would 
have prevented much of the irregularity, but this would have been more costly: 
the State would have had to invest much more in its foreign services and in inter-
nal Labour Inspection and job market services in order to regulate the arrival of 
immigrants. Th us, ‘extra ordinary’ regularizations have, de facto, become the main 
instrument of immigration management, and have turned into a ‘cheap way’ to 
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adapt labour market demands to foreign workforce supply, relying on the eﬃ  -
ciency of the ‘invisible hand of the market.’
Th e article on Greece entitled Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 
21st Century, Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?, written by 
Anna Triandafyllidou, discusses the development of Greek immigration policy 
during the past 18 years. Starting with inﬂ ows of co-ethnics from the former 
Soviet Union during Perestrojka in the 1980s, Greece experienced massive immi-
gration from the Balkan region (Albania in particular) and also from the wider 
Central and Eastern European region (Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Poland among others) during the 1990s. While there is no more massive 
immigration during this decade, inﬂ ow has continued not only from the coun-
tries mentioned above, but also from much more distant countries located in 
Southeast Asia (Bangladesh and Pakistan) and sub-Saharan Africa.
Greek governments and Greek public opinion were unprepared to deal with 
these ﬂ ows when they started and it took ten years for a Greek immigration policy 
to take shape. Th e aim of this article is to present and critically discuss the devel-
opment of Greek immigration policy from 1991 to the present with a view to 
identifying the main factors that have shaped it, paying special attention to the 
role of political parties, trade unions, civil society actors and of course the Euro-
pean context within which these policies were formed. Th e study distinguishes 
between two phases of policy development: the early phase spanning between 
1991 and 2001 when piece meal restrictive measures and mass deportations were 
the main policy instrument, and the second phase covering the period between 
2001 and today when a compre hensive even if non particularly eﬀ ective approach 
has developed. Th e main features of each law are presented and their impact on 
the management of immigration ﬂ ows and on immigrant integration is discussed 
critically. Special attention is paid to ex plaining why these particular laws were 
voted, what was the rationale that motivated diﬀ erent Greek governments to 
uphold an ineﬃ  cient and unrealistic policy for man aging immigration and 
migrant integration. Th e concluding section argues that Greek migration policy 
has to date been shaped less by left and right wing ideologies or policy choices and 
more by a weird combination of nationalist ideology, lack of po litical will and free 
market laissez faire principles.
Last but not least, Catarina Sabino, Alexandre Abreu and João Peixoto, in their 
article on Immigration policies in Portugal: Limits and compromise in the quest for 
regulation argue that the making of policies of immigration control in Portugal 
has faced special diﬃ  culties due to the variations experienced in the balance 
between inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows of migration. Contrary to Spain, Greece and Italy, 
Portugal has experienced a continuing declining of immigration during this 
decade and a relevant emigration, due to the economic crisis it is suﬀ ering since 
2002. Inﬂ ows have not been stable and its characteristics have varied while 
EU membership constrained some of the classical regulation mechanisms, 
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notably since the opening of EU internal borders allowed by the Schengen Agree-
ment. Since immigration to Portugal was, until the mid-1990s, mostly composed 
of Portuguese-speaking immigrants, a benevolent attitude may have been built, 
given the historical, linguistic and cultural similarities. Th e fact that Portugal is 
still facing a signiﬁ cant out-migration, mostly to other European countries (such 
as Spain, the UK and Switzerland), has contributed to the association between 
discourses on immigration and on emigration and an anti-immigrant discourse 
has been weak and has not paid oﬀ  until today in the Portuguese political system. 
In fact, political elites showed a signiﬁ cant consensus along the time in immigra-
tion policy and the ‘central bloc’, a tacit or explicit alliance between the two main 
parties, the Socialist and the Social Democratic, functioned more than once 
on this realm.
However, despite this consensus, the gap between policy and outcome has been 
considerable since the 1980s. Th e political discourse has been keen in proclaim-
ing an objective of strict regulation and control, while several measures were 
launched to promote legal immigration and to manage international labour 
recruitment, but all policy mechanisms devised to facilitate legal immigration 
proved to be ineﬀ ective and the eﬀ orts for control have been insuﬃ  cient (regard-
ing border and, mostly, internal control). Other factors were hindering political 
regulation, as the high demand in labour-intensive sectors, particularly in the 
informal economy and the pre-eminence of informal social networks. Th e open-
ing of borders in the Schengen space partly explains the arrival of thousands of 
irregular immigrants from Eastern European countries but does not account for 
other sources of irregular migrants coming from African countries and Brazil. In 
short, irregular immigration has been endemic in Portuguese society and extra-
ordinary regularizations were frequently used as a substitute for the eﬃ  cient man-
agement of migration ﬂ ows.
Th e studies presented here are the result of a research project, Immigration and 
Party Systems, ﬁ nanced by the Spanish Ministry of Science (SEJ2005-04193/
CPOL) and directed by Carmen González-Enríquez. Th is research developed 
during the years 2007 and 2008 was based on a common outline in the four 
countries and was elabo rated through the analysis of primary and secondary 
sources and of personal semi-structured interviews with decision-makers, politi-
cians, unionists, leaders of employ ers associations, ONGs, other stakeholders and 
specialized scholars.
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